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Abstract  
What explains the demand for regulation when institutions are considered ineffective, 
corrupt or incompetent? This thesis presents a novel study of the public’s attitudes towards 
marine aquaculture and regulation of a new group of actors, fish farmers, that both generate 
public goods, but also make use of a common good. While previous explanations have 
shown that the demand for regulation of actors with corrupt institutions can be explained by 
social distrust and a will to punish and restrain market actors, this study builds on the 
suggested explanation that it is rather lack of political trust. What it is in political trust has 
however not yet been explained. A suggested mechanism is that the perceived capacity of 
bureaucrats handling marine aquaculture leads to a demand for regulation. The main 
assumption in this thesis is therefore that when institutions are perceived to be ineffective in 
protecting common resources, the public wants the bureaucrats to work under very detailed 
regulations rather than having a lot of freedom in their work, instead of restraining fish 
farmers. A post-test survey experiment with 3.373 respondents could not confirm this 
suggested mechanism, nor the explanations found in previous research. The study however 
still fills a gap in the research. Individuals seem to demand a high degree of regulation of 
marine aquaculture, and this does not hinge upon the perceived effectiveness of either 
institutions or fish farmers.  
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1. Introduction 
Overfishing of the world’s oceans is threatening marine ecosystems and posing serious 
societal problems worldwide. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing has escalated in the 
past 20 years and around 30 percent of the assessed fish stocks are estimated being 
overfished. Fish has been recognised as playing a critical role in food security and 
nutritional needs globally, and as the world’s population increases a challenge is to produce 
nutritious food in an environmentally sustainable way. Fish is further amongst the most 
traded food commodities worldwide, with the European Union as the largest market for 
import of fish, and currently growing. At the same time only about 2 percent of food 
production currently comes from the sea, and a possible solution has therefore emerged in 
marine aquaculture. Even if disputed, marine aquaculture has been put forward as a 
“sustainable solution” to the increased demand for fish and seafood, as well as food 
production in general (FAO 2014; SWEMARC 2015). Marine aquaculture is a growing 
industry with possible negative externalities, and is in need of new technology as well as 
successful environmental management, requiring political institutions and regulation. It is a 
complex matter because it both generates public goods, but can at the same time pose 
serious negative externalities with environmental degradation in marine areas, which is a 
common good.  
There is an increased interest in the academic society to study explanations of the 
demand for regulation of actors that either generate negative externalities or fail to sustain 
and provide public goods. Trust has been highlighted as an important factor, where it is 
argued that distrust in market actors leads to demand for more coercive policy tools such as 
regulations. In low trust societies people do not trust market actors in doing the right thing, 
for instance protect the environment, and authorities also fail to protect the common pool 
resource. People thus demand more regulation from authorities to punish or prevent new 
possible free riders. Even when authorities are considered ineffective or corrupt, state 
control is found to be preferred over uncontrolled market actors (Aghion et al. 2010; Di 
Tella and MacCulloch 2009; Dimitrova-Grajzl & Guse 2011, Harring 2014a; Harring 2015; 
Pinotti 2011). This explanation has however been questioned. Studying policy preference for 
resource users when institutions are considered ineffective, Harring and Rönnerstrand 
(2016) find that the public demands more regulation regardless of the resource users 
following the rules or not. It is not the market actors the public wants to regulate and 
constrain when institutions are considered ineffective or corrupt, but rather the bureaucrats. 
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Political trust thus challenges the previous explanation for the demand for regulation, 
namely social trust. Inspired by the research on the welfare state (Dahlström, Lindvall & 
Rothstein 2013), it is further suggested that perceptions of bureaucratic capacity is the causal 
mechanism explaining this demand for regulation. Regulation can be perceived as implying 
less bureaucratic discretion, and therefore preferred when institutions are perceived as 
ineffective. If bureaucrats handling aquaculture are seen as ineffective, corrupt or 
incompetent, presumably people cannot trust them protecting the environment, and would 
want to limit their freedom and make them work under very clear regulations. The 
assumption in this thesis is therefore that when institutions are seen as ineffective, the 
demand for regulation can be explained by a wish to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats, 
rather than the will to punish free-riding market actors. The aim of the thesis is to investigate 
the whether ineffective institutions makes people demand more regulation, and if this can be 
explained by a willingness to restrict the bureaucrats rather than the market actors.  This will 
be tested in a post-test survey experiment.   
The thesis is unique as it is one of few studies of marine aquaculture from the 
perspective of political science. It as well takes departure in a theoretically interesting puzzle 
in what can explain the demand for regulation, and applying it on a suitable and highly 
relevant case. It makes distinct contributions to the research by filling in two gaps; there is 
firstly little knowledge about the attitudes and opinions towards marine aquaculture. 
Secondly, it is a unique possibility to study people’s attitudes towards regulation of a new 
group of actors, that in different manners threatens common goods, but also contributes to a 
public good. Previous research has for example been concerned with the attitudes towards 
regulation among resource users themselves (for example Jagers, Berlin & Jentoft 2012; 
Gezelius 2002), but little research has been concerned with public attitudes towards 
regulation of actors, not at least in the field of marine aquaculture. We thus know little about 
what the public thinks of regulation of resource users. This is however important, as the 
legitimacy of regulations within natural resource governance is important in a liberal 
democracy (Zannakis, Wallin & Johansson 2015: 425).  
The thesis is divided into five main sections and proceeds as follows; section 2 lays 
out the theoretical background for this thesis; The role of the state in natural resource 
management, policy instruments and the demand for regulation when institutions are seen as 
dysfunctional will further be explored, as well as the role of trust as explanatory factor for 
compliance towards policy regimes. The possible new mechanism for explaining the 
demand for regulation, bureaucratic capacity, will thereafter be explained. Section 3 presents 
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the research design and case, before the results are presented and analysed according to 
hypotheses. In the final section the results are discussed before the conclusion and future 
research are suggested. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 The regulatory state and its role natural resource management  
Regulations are a central theme within political science and of natural resource management 
especially. Central in the discussion of its origin and development, is the rise of “the 
regulatory state” that started accelerating in Europe in the 1970s. It was conditioned by 
deregulation and privatizations, and replaced the “dirigiste state” of the past (Majone 1994). 
Privatization and deregulation changed the role of the state from a producer of services and 
goods to functioning more as an umpire making sure economic actors played by the rules. 
With privatization or deregulation one did not get a retreat of the state, but rather a 
redefinition of its functions, such as strengthening the state’s regulatory capacities in areas 
such as competition, environment and consumer protection (Majone 1994: 77, 80; 
Braithwaite 2009: 217-218). Regulation is introduced with the normative justification of 
correction of market failures and refers to “sustained and focused control exercised by a 
public agency, on the basis of a legislative mandate, over activities that are generally 
regarded as desirable to society” (Selznick 1985: 363-4 in Majone 1996: 9). This implies 
that regulation is not only achieved by passing a law, but also requires detailed knowledge 
and involvement with the regulated activity, necessitating the creation of specialised 
agencies (Majone 1996: 9). Regulations are also referred to as the government’s stick, used 
to define norms, acceptable behaviour and to limit activities. It is argued that regulatory 
intervention should be introduced when it serves “the common good” or “public interest”. 
Regulations are effective in changing behaviour as long as a social consensus exists around 
the government policy. The effectiveness of regulatory instruments is also determined by 
their legitimacy, which also hinges upon policy context and the capacity of a government 
organization to ensure compliance (Lemaire 1998: 59-71).  
The lack of collective action in preserving the environment and common-pool 
resources calls for this higher levels of state action, where the state inhibits the role of 
monitoring compliance and sanction defection (Mansbridge 2014: 8). It is argued that 
“…without some external support of such [higher-level state] institutions, it is unlikely that 
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reciprocity alone completely solves the more challenging common-pool resource problems” 
(Ostrom 1998: 17). Researchers have been concerned with different policy instruments 
meant to correct for negative externalities or induce compliance of actors that fail to sustain 
or provide public goods. Public support is considered to play a major role in whether 
politicians decide to implement environmental policies aiming at changing behaviour of 
citizens or market actors (de Groot & Schuitema 2012: 100). Without support policies might 
not get implemented or have intended effects, since lack of support might affect willingness 
to comply with policies, and politicians fear loss of electoral support if they implement 
policies without the support of the public (Harring 2014b: 11; Jagers & Hammar 2009: 219; 
Jones et al. 2009: 598; Lubell et al. 2006: 149). Opposition from the public is thus the 
primary barrier to implementation of policies to mitigate or solve environmental problems 
(Cherry, Kallbekken & Kroll 2012: 95).  
Instruments or policies in which the state can exercise control over citizens or market 
actors can be understood in terms of coerciveness and considered either as pull or push 
measures. Information is seen as the least coercive and more of a pull measure, market-
based instruments (taxes or subsidies) in the middle and regulations are seen as the most 
coercive instrument, thereby a push measure (de Groot & Schuitema 2012; Harring 2014b: 
19). They are also called command and control instruments, or hard policy instruments and 
implying high levels of state intervention and constraints on behaviour of citizens 
(Eckerberg 1997 in Jones et al. 2009: 602). In an experimental study it is found that there is 
an aversion towards regulation, and this is least preferred over taxes and subsidies (Cherry, 
Kallbekken & Kroll 2012: 95). This is also found studying travel demand management 
measures, where the coercive measures are the least acceptable to the public than non-
coercive, and thus less politically feasible to implement (Eriksson, Garvill & Nordlund 
2006: 23; Gärling & Schuitema 2007: 149).  
For this thesis and marine aquaculture as a case, regulations are interesting both for 
how it affects resource users (fish farmers) and bureaucrats within fisheries management. 
For the fish farmers, regulation implies making them follow stricter regulations ensuring that 
precautions for environmental sustainability are met, as opposed to letting them work 
without guidelines or regulations. For bureaucrats, regulations can be argued to imply less 
bureaucratic capacity and assessments as opposed to for instance handling of subsidies. This 
can however also be argued to be the opposite, when comparing for instance parental leave 
benefits and active labour market policies. The first requires no assessment and less capacity 
by bureaucrats since it is easy to establish who is entitled to the benefit, while the latter 
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requires more assessment, higher levels of competence as well as a high level of reliability 
(Dahlström, Lindvall and Rothstein 2013: 527). This thesis assumes regulations as a 
thorough set of rules and regulations for bureaucrats where they to a lesser degree will be 
able to exercise discretion, while subsidies are considered as in need of higher assessments 
and thereby more discretion and capacity from the bureaucrats.  
 
2.2 The demand for regulation with dysfunctional authorities 
Different cross-country comparative studies of policy predictors have come to what can be 
seen as somewhat contradictory findings, where dysfunctional authorities or low quality of 
public institutions (low Quality of Government, QoG), in the form of ineffective or corrupt 
institutions, and distrust are linked with a demand for more coercive policy tools and more 
regulation (Aghion et al. 2010; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2009; Dimitrova-Grajzl & Guse 
2011; Harring 2014a; Harring 2015; Pinotti 2011). It can be seen as contradictive because 
corrupt and ineffective institutions normally do not provide public or common goods, so 
why would one want to see more government regulation? (Harring 2015: 1). Or “why it is 
that people in countries with bad governments want more government intervention?” 
(Aghion et al. 2010: 4). In fact, studies have found that environmental regulations will make 
bureaucrats engage in more corrupt behaviour, since this type of regulation requires 
monitoring of compliance, and bureaucrats are considered to be self-interested agents 
(Acemoglu & Verdier 2000; Damania 2002).   
The explanation provided for the demand for more government intervention through 
regulation is that there is a trade-off between market failure and government failure, which 
are also found to correlate. Neither government nor market actors are able to provide 
common or public goods, and trust levels are generally low (Acemoglu & Verdier 2000; 
Aghion et al. 2010; Harring 2015). In such low trust societies people believe that market 
actors cheat and thus naturally have little trust in them. To control the free riding market 
actors, support is given to government regulation, which in turn also can stop possible new 
cheating market actors to enter the market. Distrust thus influences the demand for 
regulation, even if regulation might lead to more corruption. People see that “government is 
bad, but business is worse” and the will to punish the market actors is bigger (Aghion et al. 
2010: 18). While this model focuses on individual’s perceptions of trustworthiness towards 
regulation of market actors, Harring (2015) focuses on regulation both towards market 
actors and individuals. Also here, a preference for coercive regulatory instruments is found. 
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This is explained by low quality of public institutions (low QoG), which in turn correlates 
with low social trust. Citizens and market actors both have a preference for regulatory 
instruments, because they want to punish free riders (Harring 2015). Experimental studies 
and public good games can further help explain the will to punish free riders, even if 
punishment is seen as costly. In public goods games, cooperation leads to a group-beneficial 
outcome, but is jeopardized by selfish incentives to free ride on others contributions 
(Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter 2008: 1363). Taking this experimental approach, Fehr and 
Gächter (2002) show that altruistic punishment of defectors is key in explaining cooperation, 
as punishment of non-cooperators raise cooperation levels in subsequent rounds of a public 
goods game. Punishment can be seen as altruistic because it is costly for the punisher, but 
provides a benefit to other members by making non-cooperators increase their investment. 
Further, Herrmann, Thöni and Gächter (2008) show that people punish not only free riders, 
but also cooperators in public goods games. Participants that had been punished in the past 
for contributing too little might retaliate against cooperators because they do punish free 
riders. This “antisocial” punishment can lead to strong differences in cooperation levels and 
that punishment opportunities are beneficial when complemented by strong social norms of 
cooperation (Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter 2008: 1362-1366). Consequently, one can assume 
that if both institutions are making small efforts to hinder environmental degradation and 
fish farmers are considered to cheat with environmental guidelines to increase their profits, 
the public would want to punish them with stricter regulations to make them comply with 
the rules and also hinder new defectors in entering the market. 
The willingness to punish free riders by demanding more regulation is further found 
in a series of different studies. Asking why capitalism does not flow to poor countries, Di 
Tella and MacCulloch (2009) for instance show how perceptions of widespread corruption 
lead to demands for more regulations to punish corrupt market actors. Corruption reduces 
the legitimacy of a country’s commercial institutions, which makes a capitalist system 
undesirable for the public. They show that increase in perceived corruption leads to electing 
more left-wing government that would regulate market actors more stringently (Di Tella & 
MacCulloch 2009). Concerns about market failures also leads to a demand for stringent 
regulation, which are enacted as a response to market failures caused by opportunistic 
behaviour of agents in the economy (Pinotti 2011: 653, 675). Dimitrova-Grajzl, Grajzl and 
Guse (2011) question whether the trade-off between market and government failure, also 
leads to citizens’ demand for government regulation. They find that trust in market actors 
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and perceptions of corruption, and their interaction, appear jointly as explanatory variables 
for the demand for regulation.  
 Together these studies find that ineffective or corrupt institutions lead to a demand 
for more government intervention through regulation. The explanation is a co-variation 
between ineffective institutions and distrust. So, in low trust societies, people do not trust 
market actors, and to restrain and punish them, support for government control through 
regulation is fuelled. Applying this line of reasoning to marine aquaculture, if institutions are 
considered ineffective in preserving natural resources and people do not trust fish farmers to 
cooperate either, there is a demand for more regulation to restrain the fish farmers. “People 
want regulation and punishment, not because they trust or believe that the state can solve the 
problem of environmental degradation, but because they have very low trust in other actors 
cooperating and acting in an environmentally friendly manner” (Harring 2015: 5). The will 
to punish free riding fish farmers and hinder entrance of possible new cheating fish farmers 
is found to be more important than the possible corrupt behaviour or ineffectiveness of 
institutions. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Perceptions of ineffective market actors increase the demand for regulation, 
even if institutions are perceived as corrupt.  
 
2.3 Trust as explanatory factor  
2.3.1 Trust in market actors 
While some argue that collective action can be achieved without mutual trust (Raymond 
2006), trust has been lifted as the explanatory factor for overcoming social dilemmas or 
collective action problems, in which environmental problems largely can be understood 
(Ostrom 1998; Uslaner 1999: 31; Yamagishi 1986: 115). Social dilemmas can be defined by 
two properties: “(a) each individual receives a higher payoff for a socially defecting choice 
(…) than for a socially cooperative choice, no matter what the other individuals in society 
do, but (b) all individuals are better off if all cooperate than if all defect” (Dawes 1980: 169). 
Likewise, a common good like the ocean can be overused by harvesting some of the valued 
goods produced by it or by treating it as a sink by putting in unwanted by-products. The 
common resource face two different problems, where the first is subtraction of the resource 
or destruction of the resource, and the second is the free rider problem which comes from 
the cost of excluding individuals from benefits generated by the resource in question (Dietz 
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et al. 2002: 18; Hardin 1968; Olson 1965: 2). This is also what has been termed problems of 
free riding of the first-order and second-order. The first occurs when people do not 
cooperate to change behaviour to protect the environment and the second when people do 
not comply with sanction schemes or policies to overcome the free riding problem of the 
first-order (Harring 2014a: 22; Ostrom 1998: 8; Yamigishi 1986: 111). In the same way, fish 
farmers, even if producing public goods, can overuse the common good with for instance 
pollutants destroying seabed ecosystems, and further not comply with rules and regulations 
meant to combat such problems. The result being that the ocean gets polluted. 
Trust in market actors, the fish farmers, is therefore central for this thesis and is 
assumed to work in the same manner as generalized trust. Generalized trust is found to be 
the core link together with components of networks and formal and informal rules important 
in obtaining collective action and to solve social dilemmas (Ostrom 1998: 1; Ostrom & Ahn 
2003: 14-16). Generalized trust refers to the idea that “most people can be trusted” (Uslaner 
2002: 5), and is also important when it comes to implementation of environmental policy 
instruments. The assumption is that citizens will act for a common benefit based on belief 
that other members act in the same manner.  High levels of social capital or generalized trust 
will make people work for a common interest, as well as support formal rules. Research on 
acceptance of environmental policy has seen that generalized trust makes people more 
willing to accept such policies, and that levels of trust consequently affect the influence of 
free riding behaviours (de Groot and Schuitema 2012; Hammar & Jagers 2006; 614; Harring 
2014b: 12, 18; Jones et al. 2009;).  
While this thesis is investigating trust in market actors or resource users, it is 
important to point out that generalized trust and trust in market actors or resource users, may 
not be quite the same. Generalized trust gives an indication of whether people consider 
people they do not know to be working for a common good, such as not polluting the ocean. 
Both Aghion et al (2010) and Pinotti (2011) use trust in others as a proxy for market failures 
or “individual concerns about opportunistic behaviour of entrepreneurs” (Pinotti 2011: 651). 
Aghion et al (2010) further argues that social trust also works for perceptions of market 
actors, where low trust correlates with the demand for regulation explained by perceptions 
of others, and not through the perceptions of institutions. It has also been argued that the 
mechanisms that explain the preference for steering instruments targeting business actors 
and individuals are the same. “People prefer to punish actors independently of whether they 
are citizens of business actors” (Harring 2015: 16). An assumption in this thesis is that trust 
in market actors follows the same line of reasoning as for generalized trust.  The next section 
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will also explain how Quality of Government affects social trust, as well as being highly 
correlated with political trust.  
 
2.3.2 Political trust  	  
Social trust or generalized trust is argued to derive from Quality of Government or the 
quality of public institutions (Herreros & Criado 2008; Levi 1998, Rothstein 2003; Rothstein 
& Stolle 2008). Another line of reasoning sees it the other way around, namely that social or 
generalized trust coming from “civic engagement” has caused effective and democratic 
institutions (Putnam 1993: 101-103). Following the first causal order, governments may 
function as an establisher of trust among citizens, with democratic institutions being better 
than undemocratic in fostering such trust. It is argued that critical for this task is rightly 
understood and used coercion, through the capacity to monitor laws and sanction 
lawbreakers. If there is doubt that the state will enforce these tasks and function as a credible 
enforcer, people will not trust the state (Levi 1998: 5,7). This is confirmed empirically, 
where in countries with a more efficient state there is a probability that people trust their 
fellow citizens to a higher degree, the mechanism being that the state functions as a third-
party enforcer of agreements (Herreros & Criado 2008: 63-66). Trust in political institutions 
means that individuals perceive that the institutions are impartial, effective and fair in doing 
what they are supposed to (Rothstein & Stolle 2008: 12). In relation to public policies such 
as taxes or social spending, it is found that the perception of the level of QoG (measured by 
impartiality and efficiency) is important in relation to public support for such policies 
(Svallfors 2013: 377). Likewise, people with perceptions of trustworthy institutions tend to 
also support environmental policy efforts, such as environmental taxes, subsidies and other 
market based tools meant to internalise environmental costs or punish non-environmental 
friendly behaviour. Simply put, “why would I support an increased tax burden imposed on 
me by someone I do not trust? (Hammar & Jagers 2006: 615). Political trust is found to have 
a significant effect on attitudes towards increased tax on carbon dioxide in Sweden 
(Hammar & Jagers 2006; Hammar, Jagers & Norblom 2008; Harring 2014a: 119-120; 
Harring 2014b: 1; Harring 2015: 16; Harring & Jagers 2013), being an important factor for 
support for a fuel- and transport tax in Norway (Kallbekken & Sælen 2011; Kallbekken, 
Garcia & Korneliussen 2013), as well as explaining success for air policy activism (Lubell et 
al. 2006: 158). A problem with green tax reform is a lack of trust that the government will 
use the tax revenues as promised (Dresner et al. 2006).  
	   13	  
When it comes to environmental policies such as government regulations within 
environmental issues, trust in particular authorities and perceptions of quality of institutional 
arrangements are important factors explaining acceptability of these governmental 
regulations. This in turn also influences perceptions of authorities being environmentally 
effective and impartial when enforcing rules. It is argued that public willingness to accept 
and follow rules is an indication of legitimacy as well as trust in the regulatory system. 
Without it, there may be that “enforcement measures will fail in the long run” (Zannakis, 
Wallin & Johansson 2015: 424-425). Trust in public institutions is thus important, when 
they are considered effective, competent, impartial and trustworthy, people see efforts from 
implementing policies or government intervention through regulations as something 
legitimate, necessary and well-functioning. Likewise, with perceptions of ineffective, 
corrupt, untrustworthy and incompetent public institutions, people might find efforts and 
regulations to be wasteful.  
While both generalized trust and political trust is found to be important for 
acceptance of environmental policies (Harring & Jagers 2013), institutional trust (political 
trust) is regarded as the most important component when it comes to successful 
implementation of command and control types of instruments, such as regulations. 
Institutional trust refers both to political institutions and institutions of law and order. The 
first affects level of compliance because it is linked to the belief of effectiveness, and the 
second because these institutions are responsible for external control mechanisms (Jones et 
al. 2009: 602). Political trust is thus vital to this thesis, as it says something about how 
people perceive the effectiveness of institutions managing regulations and policies towards 
aquaculture, as well as acceptance towards the policies such as regulations. When authorities 
are considered effective in protecting common resources when it comes to marine 
aquaculture, people will find policies and regulations legitimate. People will also perceive 
that the authorities are effective in catching free riding market actors and hinder possible 
new defectors from entering the market. Regulations are something legitimate, well-
functioning and necessary to preserve common resources, regardless of how compliant or 
not the market actors might be. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Perceptions of effective institutions increase the demand for regulation, 
regardless of compliance of market actors.  
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Further, marine aquaculture is an industry that typically receives subsidies, and if people 
have confidence in the public institutions doing what they should in an impartial, fair and 
trustworthy manner, they will not fear money will disappear into the hands of corrupt or 
incompetent bureaucrats. Individuals will therefore entrust them with policies that require 
more assessments and discretionary decision-making than regulations. One can therefore 
hypothesise:  
 
H3: Perceptions of effective institutions increase the demand for subsidies to 
aquaculture, regardless of compliance of market actors. 
 
2.3.3 Vertical and horizontal trust explaining compliance among resource users 
When it comes to natural resource management and resource users in particular, the 
horizontal trust between resource users as well as the vertical trust towards institutions have 
been explored by researchers and can explain difference in compliance towards policy 
regimes. It is for instance found that lobster fishers in Maine use informal norms about 
territoriality and ownership, which has substantial and ecological and economic impact 
(Acheson 1975: 184). The importance of social capital embedded in participatory groups 
within rural communities, is found to be central in natural resource management and to 
achieve sustainable and equitable solutions to local development problems (Cramb 2006; 
Pretty & Ward 2001; Pretty 2003). Lubell (2004) also argues that cooperation between 
stakeholders at the grass-root (fishers and farmers that actually consume natural resources) 
is necessary for successive collaborative management, found in watershed management in 
Florida. Participation in collaborative management is linked to social capital, where 
participation is driven by expectations of reciprocity from other farmers as well as trust in 
local government (Lubell 2004: 22). On the other hand, Lundqvist (2001) finds that, even 
with given advantageous options for collective action, farmers in an actor game aimed at 
finding ways to institutionalize cooperation of farmers in water catchment threatened by 
eutrophication from fertilizer-use, did not cooperate. Even with harsh measures from central 
authorities, the farmers stuck to their preference for individual management (2001: 407). 
Sjöstedt (2013) finds that the variation in the stability of marine ecosystems across countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by differences in both the horizontal relationship 
between resource users and the vertical relationship between the resource users and the 
government. 
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Together, the research on trust, both generalized and political (institutional) trust 
show that it is an important explanatory factor for compliance towards policy regimes as 
well as towards policy instruments meant to protect the environment. For this thesis it is 
vital to determine what kind of trust that is the important one. Stern and Coleman (2015) 
distinguish between four different kinds of trust; dispositional is the general tendency for an 
individual to trust or distrust another individual in a specific context, rational is based on 
perceptions of utility of the expected outcome, affinitive trust is trusting an entity based 
primarily on emotions and procedural refers to trust in procedures or other systems that 
decrease vulnerability of potential trustor (Stern & Coleman 2015: 122). When it comes to 
the case of marine aquaculture, and how corrupt institutions could affect the publics demand 
for regulation, rational trust is the interesting component, as an expected outcome would be 
to limit defectors to enter the market or control them to a large enough extent. For this thesis 
trustworthiness will therefore be measured as perceptions of effectiveness, following 
Harring and Rönnerstrand (2016), for market actors it implies being effective in protecting 
the environment and following rules and regulations, whilst for institutions it entails being 
effective in securing the environment with new fish farming start-ups, as well as hinder 
possible free riders of entering the market. 
 
2.4 Bureaucratic capacity as causal mechanism 
While previous research has linked dysfunctional authorities with low trust and a demand to 
regulate market actors, Harring and Rönnerstrand (2016) find that it is not the market actors 
the public wants to regulate, but rather the bureaucrats. Political trust, measured as 
effectiveness of authorities in preventing defectors from entering the market, is found to 
have substantial effect on the preference for command and control type of policy measure. 
By isolating the effect of trust in market actors and trust in authorities in a scenario 
experiment, it is found that ineffective institutions create a demand for regulatory punishing 
instruments, regardless of the resource users being compliant to rules or not (Harring & 
Rönnerstrand 2016). The demand for regulation is thus dependent on political trust, rather 
than trust in others or market actors. These results question the previous mechanism where 
the explanation for demand for regulation is the relationship between dysfunctional 
authorities and low trust in market actors (measured through trust in others). While H2 
intuitively claimed that effective institutions creates the demand for more regulations 
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because individuals have trust in institutions, the following hypothesis is contrasting this 
view:  
H4: Perceptions of ineffective institutions increase the demand for regulation, 
regardless of compliance of market actors.  
 
Inspired by research on the welfare state (Dahlström, Lindvall & Rothstein 2013), it is 
further suggested that the causal mechanism for demand for regulation with inefficient 
institutions, is bureaucratic discretion or capacity, which is something that is preferred when 
authorities are seen as effective. Some types of policies and reforms demand more 
bureaucratic discretion, which is found to be important for implementation and support for 
policies together with political trust (Dahlström, Lindvall & Rothstein 2013; Hammar, 
Jagers & Nordblom 2008). Studying twenty advanced democracies over two decades, 
perceptions of bureaucratic capacity is for instance found to affect policy choices within 
welfare state programmes. Public spending on active labour market programmes involves a 
great deal of bureaucratic discretion because they are complex and involve free riding risks, 
whereas parental leave benefits involve less bureaucratic discretion. In countries with a 
corrupt or incompetent bureaucracy, i.e. low bureaucratic capacity, governments spend less 
on programmes that require bureaucrats to use their discretion to make case-by-case 
decisions, such as labour market programmes. This is also linked to the public’s perceptions 
of the quality of public institutions, where support will not be given to generous policies if 
people do not trust the authorities monitoring the programmes (Dahlström, Lindvall & 
Rothstein 2013: 524). Perceptions of bureaucratic capacity thus affect what policies are 
implemented.  
Likewise, Pierre and Rothstein (2011) see a revival of the rule-based bureaucracy 
emphasising legality, hierarchy and impartiality (Weberian bureaucracy) in the area of New 
Public Management reforms. It is argued that market-based reforms are contingent upon 
already existing Weberian structures, the reason being that it “… directly or indirectly, 
creates and reproduces trust between the state and its citizenry and also in markets” (Pierre 
& Rothstein 2011: 406). Regulations can be argued to demand less bureaucratic capacity 
and case-by-case decisions by bureaucrats, than for instance subsidies or environmental 
taxes. This is linked to political trust, shown to affect acceptance towards Pigouvian types of 
environmental taxes (meant to correct for negative externalities), namely because they imply 
a lot of capacity from the bureaucracy. Political distrust implies that people lack confidence 
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in the discretion of public institution’s ability to set correct tax rates and incentives right. 
The tax might therefore end up being suboptimal (Hammar, Jagers & Nordblom 2008: 539).  
In fisheries management in Sweden, bureaucrats enjoy a great deal of discretion in 
their line of work, and it is found that they tend to not consider environmental goals to be 
legitimate and thus disregards them, even if they are a part of the Swedish fisheries policy. 
At the same time, the bureaucrats’ daily tasks involve for instance exemption from 
regulations within legislation, decisions regarding grants for investments and the right to 
deploy fish in fish farms. Their bureaucratic discretion is high, which they use to promote 
commercial rather than environmental interest (Sevä and Jagers 2013: 1065-1068). It might 
then be plausible that if people also have the perception that authorities are being ineffective 
in securing the environment and the bureaucrats cannot be trusted, people would want to 
restrain their discretionary power in form of stricter regulations, rather than regulate the fish 
farmers. It seems natural that one wants to restrain the actor that is perceived to be 
corrupted. This leads to the following hypothesis:   
 
H5: The effect of perceived corruption on the demand for regulation can be 
explained by willingness to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats rather than freedom 
of resource users.  
 
2.5 Aim and hypotheses 
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the assumption that when institutions are seen as 
ineffective, individuals demand more regulation, and this demand can be explained by a 
willingness to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats rather than fish farmers. A post-test survey 
experiment will try to seek explanatory evidence for what it is in political trust than can 
explain the demand for regulation when institutions are seen as ineffective, as well as test 
explanations found in previous research. The assumption is that bureaucratic capacity is the 
causal mechanism explaining the demand for regulation when institutions are considered 
ineffective. Therefore, individuals would want to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats, rather 
than the fish farmers with ineffective institutions. This will be tested through the previous 
stated hypotheses derived from previous research, presented together below.  
Departing from previous cross-country research, the demand for regulation and more 
coercive policies has been explained with dysfunctional authorities and distrust. In low trust 
societies with dysfunctional institutions, people do not trust authorities or market actors in 
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protecting the environment. There is therefore a demand for regulation to punish free riders 
and also hinder possible new free riders to enter the market. More regulation might lead to 
more corrupt behaviour by bureaucrats, but this is considered of less importance than the 
will to punish free riders. Taking this to marine aquaculture, if both institutions and fish 
farmers are seen as ineffective in protecting the environment, there should be a demand for 
regulation to punish the fish farmers, even if this might lead to more corrupt behaviour by 
bureaucrats. Ineffective fish farmers would imply that they have not put in the efforts in 
securing the environment, either by being inconsiderate or not follow rules and regulations 
in place for safeguarding marine areas. This leads to the first hypothesis to be tested: 
 
H1: Perceptions of ineffective market actors increase the demand for regulation, 
even if political institutions are corrupt.  
 
H1 is rejected if no effect is found for perceptions of ineffective fish farmers when 
institutions are also perceived as corrupt or ineffective, on the demand for regulation. A 
competing explanatory factor for the demand for regulation is political trust. Political trust 
has shown to be an important factor explaining individuals acceptance towards government 
regulations within environmental issues. When institutions are seen as trustworthy and 
effective, regulations are seen as legitimate and necessary for preserving common resources 
and institutions are believed to for instance catching defecting fish farmers. One can 
therefore intuitively hypothesise:  
 
H2: Perceptions of effective institutions increase the demand for regulations, 
regardless of compliance of market actors.  
 
The perceptions of good institutions can also have a stronger effect, where the public also 
entrust bureaucrats with policies that require more assessment and discretion than 
regulations, such as subsidies. When people have confidence in the public institutions doing 
what they should in an impartial, fair and trustworthy manner, they will not fear that 
subsidies end up in wrong hands. Thereof the following hypothesis:  
 
H3: Perceptions of effective institutions increase the demand for subsidies to 
aquaculture, regardless of compliance of market actors.  
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On the other hand, recent research finds that ineffective institutions lead to a demand for 
regulation regardless of market actors being compliant. Thus, if bureaucrats are seen as 
corrupt or incompetent, people would not trust them with policies that demand them making 
case-by-case decisions, and want them working under detailed regulations. With regards to 
marine aquaculture, ineffectiveness of public institutions or bureaucrats might imply that the 
authorities are not able to protect the environment from degradation and not able to prevent 
free riding market actors to use the common good. Institutions might be perceived to not 
handle subsidies in a fair manner, and be perceived to work for commercial interests rather 
than environmental. Compliance of the fish farmers will not matter if the bureaucrats are 
perceived to be corrupt, incompetent or ineffective. A hypothesis that stand in contrast to H2  
is therefore presented:  
 
H4: Perceptions of ineffective institutions increase the demand for regulation, 
regardless of compliance of market actors. 
 
H2, H3 and H4 are rejected if perceptions of either effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
institutions do not increase the demand for regulation of actors or subsidies to aquaculture. 
The assumption in this thesis is finally that when institutions are perceived as being 
ineffective, the demand for regulation can be explained by a demand to restrict the freedom 
of the bureaucrats in fisheries management, rather than restricting the freedom of fish 
farmers. It only seems natural that when institutions are considered to be ineffective, one 
would rather try to limit the capacity or discretion of those institutions or bureaucrats, rather 
than limit the freedom of the market actors that the institutions is meant to control or 
regulate. This leads to the final hypothesis for this thesis:  
  
H5: The effect of perceived corruption on the demand for regulation can be 
explained by willingness to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats rather than the 
freedom of market actors.  
 
H5 is rejected if perceptions of ineffective institutions do not lead to a demand for regulation 
of bureaucrats rather than fish farmers.  
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3. Method, design, data and measurements 
3.1 Case: Marine aquaculture in Sweden 
Aquaculture has been recognized as an important factor for the strategy of Blue Growth 
aimed at unlocking the potential of the blue economy both in Sweden and in the EU (SOU 
2009, EC 2012). While research on new and improved fish farming techniques and solutions 
with closed facilities and land-based fish farming are being conducted, open fish farming at 
sea today dominates marine aquaculture. This kind of fish farming is associated with 
different environmental problems, such as nutrient discharges, escaping fish affecting wild 
stocks, spread of diseases in general as well as the spread of sea lice, a problem for salmon 
farming especially. Placements of new fish farms in Norway have for instance lead to 
problems with effects on special and red listed natural habitats and species. It has been 
recognised that there is a lack of knowledge when it comes to types of habitats that exists in 
the areas with new fish farming facilities, as well as the effects of discharges on habitats and 
species (Havforskningsinstituttet 2016; Vattenbrukscentrum Väst 2015). According to the 
Swedish strategy for aquaculture 2012-2020, the suitability of location of new aquaculture in 
Sweden is “assessed based on ecological, economic and social interests” (Jordbruksverket 
2012a: 19). Municipalities and county boards gives permission to new aquaculture, and 
different governmental agencies (The Swedish Board of Agriculture, The Swedish Agency 
for Marin and Water Management, The National Food Agency and The National Veterinary 
Institute) have different responsibilities when it comes to different regulations in aquaculture 
(Jordbruksverket 2012b: 8). Subsidies to aquaculture are directed through “The Sea and 
Fisheries programme 2014-2020” (Havs- och fiskeriprogrammet 2014-2020), compromised 
of financial support to partly support development of an environmentally, economically and 
socially sustainable fishery and aquaculture in Sweden, as well as partly to implement the 
integrated maritime policy and EU-directives. One of six prioritised areas is promotion of 
“an environmentally sustainable, resource-effective, innovative, competitive and knowledge 
based aquaculture”. The subsidies are handled by The Swedish Board of Agriculture 
(Jordbruksverket 2015). Since marine aquaculture is relatively new industry in Sweden it 
has not been publicly debated to the same degree as for instance controversies surrounding 
cod stocks or shrimp. The survey respondents might therefore not have preconceived 
opinions or attitudes concerning fish farming, but know to a larger degree what regulations 
entail. This is advantageous, as one to a larger extent can presume that the design and 
treatments in the survey experiment can steer the public’s preferences to a larger degree than 
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if the survey text concerned more controversial subjects. The drawback could of course be 
that survey participants do not understand the topic, but the information in the survey text 
should suffice in securing an understanding of the subject.  
 
3.2 The design  
Experimental studies are considered to be good designs for making causal inferences. 
Whether perceived trustworthiness of different actors (fish farmers or bureaucrats) has an 
effect on public demand for more regulation are therefore tested in an post-test experimental 
survey, followed by comparison of means of different treatment groups and multiple 
regressions. Experimental designs makes it possible to study one or more explanatory 
factors on the dependent variable, at the same time as other potential explanatory factors are 
held constant, through careful randomisation. Exposing the groups of different treatments, 
and having one control group without any treatment, creates variation in the independent 
variables. If there is differences in the outcomes of the treatment groups and the control 
group, one can infer that the treatments have had an effect, assuming the randomization have 
been done properly. Great care must be taken in how much variation should be given in the 
independent variables when designing the treatments, as too subtle treatments might not 
yield effects, whilst too strong might question the results. For the experiment to give 
meaningful results, randomizations have to be done without exception by chance. This is 
important so that the treatment groups and the control group are not systematically different, 
which could affect the outcome. If the compositions of the groups are very different, we 
cannot be sure that it is the treatments that have an effect (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 327-330). 
 
3.2.1 Post-test survey experiment and measurements 
The design of the survey experiment is a post-test 2x2 full factorial design, implying two 
independent variables or factors with two levels. The between-subject factors are institutions 
(portrayed as effective or not) and fish farmers (portrayed as effective or not) (see Table 1). 
The survey experiment itself is made up of a text concerning aquaculture in Sweden and 
how experts, the business and authorities are discussing how an emerging industry should be 
managed as both the EU and Sweden are financing expansion of aquaculture as a way of 
securing endangered species. The importance of the industry, as well as possible 
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environmental problems it poses is highlighted (see Appendix for the complete text and 
treatments). The treatments differ firstly with description of the authorities when it comes to 
securing the environment with new fish farming start-ups. This treatment thus captures 
whether institutions are effective or not. The second treatment captures whether the fish 
farmers have made an effort to secure the environment, thus whether they are effective or 
ineffective. The different treatments are what constitute my independent variables, 
effectiveness of institutions and ineffectiveness of fish farmers that plausibly will affect the 
outcome variables demand for regulation. Finally, some participants will receive no 
treatment at all, and thus makes up the complete control group (group E). 
Table 1  The combination of treatments will render four different scenarios (2x2). 
 









Subsequently, the respondents will answer questions that ask to what degree actors in 
aquaculture management should have great freedom, or work under very clear regulations. 
To measure the dependent variables, the questions are formulated in the following way: “To 
what degree do you think that the actors within management of fish farming should have 
great freedom or be forced to work under detailed regulations?” with answers on a scale 
from 1 (“Great freedom”) to 7 (“Very detailed regulations”). The questions are also asked 
independently regarding both authorities and fish farmers, to make it possible to single out 
whom the public possibly wants to regulate. They are formulated as follows: “Considering 
the fish authorities/fish farmers, to what degree do you think that the fish authorities/fish 
farmers should have great freedom or work under detailed regulations” with answers on a 
scale from 1 (“Great freedom”) to 7 (“Very detailed regulations”). The last question asks to 
what degree the aquaculture industry should receive subsidies, from 1 (“No subsidies at all”) 
to 7 (“A lot of subsidies”). The latter would demand more bureaucratic discretion than for 
instance stricter regulations. These questions make up my dependent variables, regulation of 
actors, regulation of bureaucrats, regulation of fish farmers and subsidies to aquaculture. 
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The control group will answer all the same questions, but will not be affected by any 
treatments.  
 As a member of the Citizen Panel where the data are collected (see next paragraph), 
the respondents are also inquired about where they stand politically on a left-right scale, as 
well as gender, age and education. Where the respondents place themselves on a “green 
environmental dimension” in Swedish politics were also added for this particular survey 
experiment. The latter, together with left-right position and education will be added as 
control variables for the regressions. Individuals placing themselves at the upper end of the 
green scale are assumed to be more open to regulations as means of preserving the 
environment. A left-leaning person presumably accepts regulations to a larger degree than a 
politically right-leaning person. More education is assumed to make you more inclined to 
know about negative side effects of fish farming, environmental problems in general as well 
as be more environmentally concerned. Well-educated and political liberals have been 
shown to be more supportive of environmental protection than their counterparts (Jones & 
Dunlap 1992). 
 
3.2.2 Data and sample characteristics 
Data for this study was gathered by The Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE), an 
organization conducting data collections through web questionnaires focusing particularly 
on experiments and panel data collections, run by the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Gothenburg. The survey experiment was sent out as an e-mail survey to 
participants in the Citizen Panel at the end of April and start of May 2016. The Citizen Panel 
is LORE’s biggest panel with approximately 50.000 self-recruited respondents and 10.000 
respondents recruited from probability based population samples. The respondents regularly 
receive questionnaires concerning politics and society. When signing up for the panel, 
participants are required to answer questions on gender, education, age, labour market 
position, county and municipality, as well as variables on political attitudes, such as left-
right scale and political trust (LORE 2016a; LORE 2016b). Since the panel is based on self-
recruitment, one can discuss whether meaningful conclusions can be drawn from such 
populations, but when the aim of a study is to develop theories, test hypotheses about cause 
and effect, can self-recruited panels be effective (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 189). A benefit of 
the panel is also that members are recruited from probability based population samples. A 
randomization control will also be conducted to ensure no systematic differences. 
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5.000 were given the possibility to partake in the survey experiment and 3.337 chose 
to participate, making the participation rate for the survey experiment 67,5 %. Of the 3.337 
participants, the majority were men (61,8 %), about half of the respondents have a higher 
education of three years of more (49,9 %), and counting in all higher education the 
percentage is 69,2. Most of the participants place themselves at the upper end of a green 
environmental dimension in Swedish politics. When it comes to placement on a left-right 
scale (0=”Far to the left”, 5= “Neither left nor right”, 10=”Far to the right”), 43,5 % place 
themselves on the left side of the scale, 13,7 % in the centre and 42,8 % to the right, thus 
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Table 2 Randomization controls of the experimental groups and the control group in 
comparable characteristics.  
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Young age (15-29) 
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6 % (41) 
 
 
35 % (240) 
 
 
34,3 % (235) 
 
 
24,8 % (170) 
 
4 % (36) 
 
 
37,1 % (248) 
 
 
32,3 % (216) 
 
 
25,1 % (168) 
 












4,9 % (32) 
 
 






































20,9 % (138) 
 
 
23,8 % (157) 
 
55,2 % (364) 
 
20,2 % (131) 
 
 






















































13,6 % (79) 
 
 
42,5 % (248) 
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3,9 % (26) 
 
15,1 % (100) 
 
 
10 % (66) 
 
 
71 % (470) 
 
3,4 % (22) 
 
15,6 % (100) 
 
 
9,3 % (60) 
 
 
71,7 % (461) 
 











4 % (25) 
 
15,4 % (97) 
 
 
















Member of or  
support an  
environmental NGO 
19 % (121) 
 
18,9 % (123) 20 % (128) 19 % (122) 22,1 % 
(139) 
19,8 (633) 
Comment: Distribution of percentages in the experimental groups and control group on background characteristics of the 
survey participants. Number of participants in parentheses.  
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research 2016 (LORE 2016)  
 
Table 2 portrays the groups in comparable characteristics, and the treatment groups and the 
control group are quite similar in these comparable characteristics. The randomization has 
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therefore worked well. Independent sample t-tests between the groups are however 
performed on the main control variables (green dimension, left-right placement and 
education) used for later analysis, to check whether the groups are statistically different in 
these key controls. The comparisons show no statistically significant differences between 
the groups in these variables (see Table 1 over t-tests in Appendix). This means that the 
groups are similar in these characteristics, and the randomization of the groups in the 
experiment has been successful.  
Turning to the dependent variables in the study, regulation of actors, regulation of 
bureaucrats and regulation of fish farmers are all quite negatively skewed, meaning that 
many of the participants have answered that they want the actors, bureaucrats and fish 
farmers to work under very detailed regulations rather than have great freedom in their work 
(see Graph 1 for regulation of fish farmers). The dependent variables therefore do not have 
normal distribution, which is important to have in mind for further analysis. The dependent 
variable subsidies to aquaculture, answers are in the middle and towards not receiving 
subsidies at all (see Graphs in Appendix). 
Graph 1  Distribution of answers on the dependent variable regulation of actors for the 
treatment groups and control group in the survey experiment. 
 
 
Comment: Distribution of answers between the groups in the question ”Considering fish farmers, to what degree do you think 
fish farmers should have great freedom or work under very detailed regulations”, ranging from 1 (Great freedom) to 7 (Very 
detailed framework). Effective & Effort represents group A, Effective & No Effort represents group B, Not Effective & Effort 
represents group C and Not Effective & No Effort represents group D. The control group is the control group (group E).  
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE 2016).  
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4. Results 
4.1 Comparisons of group means 
To study whether there are any differences in the demand for regulation of actors in general, 
bureaucrats or fish farmers, as well as to what degree aquaculture should receive subsidies, 
between the treatment groups and the control group, it is useful to investigate the group 
means (see Table 3).  
Table 3 The mean values of different forms of treatments on dependent variables, demand for 
regulation of actors, bureaucrats and fish farmers, and subsidies to aquaculture.  
 
Comment: The means of the responses to the questions “To what degree do you think the actors within aquaculture should 
have great freedom or work under very detailed regulations?” and “Considering the fish authorities/fish farmers, to what 
degree do you think that the fish authorities/fish farmers should have great freedom or be forced to work under very detailed 
regulations?” with answers on a scale from 1 (Great freedom) to 7 (Very detailed regulations).  Regarding subsidies, the 
question is formulated: “To what degree do you think that aquaculture should receive subsidies, with answers on a scale from 
1 (No subsidies at all) to 7 (A lot of subsidies). Number of survey experiment participants in parentheses.  
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE 2016)  
 
The group means do not differ to a large extent, as can be seen from the table. In scenario A 
where both authorities and fish farmers are proclaimed to be effective, people want to have 
more regulation of fish farmers than of bureaucrats. Scenario B proclaims that the 
institutions are effective, but the fish farmers have not made an effort, and not surprisingly 
this group people want more regulation of fish farmers as compared to bureaucrats. Scenario 
C however gives the perception of ineffective authorities and effective fish farmers, and in 
this group people still want fish farmers to be regulated to a larger degree than bureaucrats. 
In the scenario where both the authorities and the fish farmers are proclaimed to be 
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ineffective, people want to regulate the fish farmers to a larger degree than the bureaucrats. 
Making a new variable, grouping together group A and B, where institutions are portrayed 
as effective, does not change the mean much, neither does merging together group C and D, 
where institutions are seen as ineffective. All groups, irrespective of what treatment given 
wants to regulate the fish farmers to a larger degree than the bureaucrats and this also 
includes the control group. Regarding subsidies to aquaculture, people want more subsidies 
in the group where both institutions and fish farmers are proclaimed to be effective (A), and 
least where the institutions are portrayed as ineffective but fish farmers effective (C).   
Since my dependent variables do not have normal distribution, the Mann-Whitney U 
tests, the non-parametric equivalent of the t-test, is used to test if differences between the 
independent groups are significant or not (Field 2014: 878).1 A series of tests show that the 
groups are not statistically significantly different, meaning that the demand for regulation of 
actors, bureaucrats and fish farmers is not statistically higher in any of the groups. The 
question of subsidies to aquaculture are neither statistically significantly different between 
the groups (see Table 2 in Appendix).  
 
4.2 Regressions 
To formally test the hypotheses and to see the effects of the control variables on the 
relationships, the analysis proceeds with multiple regressions. Regression diagnostics 
according to the Best Linear Unbiased Estimate (BLUE) are performed and no problems 
with multicollinearity (correlations between the independent variables), error terms or 
outliers were encountered.2 Regressions in Table 4 show the effect from each independent 
variable  (effectiveness of institutions and ineffectiveness of fish farmers) on the dependent 
variables demand for regulation of actors, demand for regulation of bureaucrats, demand 
for regulation of fish farmers, and subsidies to aquaculture all in the same table. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  T-tests are also performed, and the tests did not show contrasting results to the Mann-Whitney U tests. 2	  Figure 1 and 2 in Appendix show the observed linearity to the dependent variable regulation of actors. No 
problem of multicollinearity is found as the lowest tolerance value is .831 and the highest VIF value is 1.187. 
Checking if the error term is well behaved, a histogram and normal probability plot is made, showing 
approximately normal distribution around the mean (Figure 3 and 4 in Appendix). The Durbin-Watson shows a 
value of 1.981 and there is therefore no autocorrelation. The error term is found to be homoscedastic (Figure 5 
in Appendix). The df-beta values and central leverage values are within acceptable ranges, and there is 
therefore no outliers affecting the values.  
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Table 4 Regressions: The effect of effectiveness of institutions and ineffectiveness of 
fish farmers on the demand for regulation of actors, bureaucrats, fish farmers 
and subsidies to aquaculture in single models. 
 
 Demand for 






regulation of         
fish farmers  
Subsidies to 
aquaculture 
  Model 1 -  
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 
farmers 
Model  1 - 
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 
farmers 
Model 1 - 
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 
farmers  
Model 1 - 
effectiveness of 
institutions and 




.059 (.052) .017 (.054) .092 (.055) .071 (.060) 
Ineffectiveness of 
fish farmers 
.031 (.052) .112 *(.054) .056 (.055) .012 (.060) 
     
Intercept 5.351 5.259 5.369 3.176 
Adjusted R2 .000 .001 .001 .000 
N 2600 2595 2597 2588 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤ .05 
Comment: The dependent variables demand for regulation of actors, bureaucrats and fish farmers is operationalized through 
the question “To what degree do you think actors within management of fish farming should have great freedom or be forced 
to work under detailed regulations?” and “Considering the fish authorities/fish farmers especially, to what degree do you think 
the fish authorities/fish farmers should have great freedom or work under detailed regulations?” ranging from 1 (Great 
freedom) to 7 (Very detailed regulations). Subsidies to aquaculture is operationalized through “To what degree do you think 
marine aquaculture should receive subsidies?” ranging from 1 (Not subsidies at all) to 7 (A lot of subsidies). Effectiveness of 
institutions is a dichotomous variable where 1=effective institutions (consisting of treatment group A and B) and 0=ineffective 
(consisting of treatment groups C and D). Ineffectiveness of fish farmers is a dichotomous variable where 1=ineffective fish 
farmers (group B and D) and 0= effective (group A and C).  
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE 2016) 
 
The regressions show that the effectiveness of institutions has a positive weak effect on the 
demand for regulation of actors (.059), of bureaucrats in particular (.017), fish farmers in 
particular (.092) and as well a positive effect on subsidies to aquaculture (.071). The effect 
is however not statistically significant. This means that we can already reject hypotheses 
claiming that the effectiveness of institutions will have an effect on the demand for 
regulation (H2) and to what degree aquaculture should receive subsidies (H3). Since the 
variable effectiveness of institutions is coded as a dichotomous variable where 1= effective 
institutions and 0= ineffective institutions, we can from this result draw the conclusion that 
ineffectiveness of institutions does not have an impact on the dependents. Hypothesis H4, 
saying that perceptions of ineffective institutions increase the demand for regulation, 
regardless of compliance of market actors, is therefore also rejected.  
H1 says that perceptions of ineffective market actors increase the demand for 
regulation, regardless of corrupt institutions. The effect of ineffective fish farmers only has a 
	   30	  
statistically significant effect on the demand for regulation of bureaucrats (.112*), but not 
for actors in general (.031) or fish farmers (.056). The theoretical assumption was that 
ineffective market actors would increase the demand for regulation, the mechanism being a 
will to punish free riding market actors. Effect is only found for regulation of bureaucrats, 
and the hypothesis is therefore rejected. Finally, H5 claims that the effect of perceived 
corruption on the demand for regulation can be explained by a willingness to restrict the 
freedom of bureaucrats rather than the freedom of market actors. This can also be rejected, 
since perceived effectiveness of institutions does not have a significant effect on either 
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While being aware of that the randomizations of the groups in the experiment have worked 
well, regressions with the control variables green dimension, left-right placement and 
education are still performed to see their effect on the dependents (Table 5).  
 
Table 5 Regression: The effect of effectiveness of institutions and ineffectiveness of fish 
farmers on the demand for regulation of actors, bureaucrats, fish farmers and 
subsidies to aquaculture in single models, under control for green dimension, 
left-right position and education.  
 
 Demand for 
regulation of     
actors 
Demand for 
regulation of  
bureaucrats 
Demand for 
regulation of          
fish farmers  
Subsidies to 
aquaculture 
 Model  1 -   
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 





Model  1 - 
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 





Model 1 - 
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 





Model 1 - 
effectiveness of 
institutions and 
ineffectiveness of fish 







.055 (.054) .022 (.058) .090 (.057) .076 (.065) 
Ineffectiveness of 
fish farmers 
.051 (.054) .125* (.058) .092 (.057) .021 (.065) 
Green dimension .338*** (.037) .269*** (.039) .419*** (.038) .138* (.044) 
Left-right placement -.255*** (.032) -.158*** (.034) -.271*** (.033) -.180*** (.038) 
Education  -.056 (.029) -.045 (.031) -.076** (.031) -.107* (.035) 
     
Intercept 5.255 5.097 5.177 3.587 
Adjusted R2 .101 .049 .123 .025 
N 2173 2171 2173  2171 
*** p≤.001, ** p≤.01, * p≤ .05 
Comment: The dependent variables demand for regulation of actors, bureaucrats and fish farmers is operationalized through 
the question “To what degree do you think actors within management of fish farming should have great freedom or be forced 
to work under detailed regulations?”, and “Considering the fish authorities/fish farmers especially, to what degree do you think 
the fish authorities/fish farmers should have great freedom or work under detailed regulations?” ranging from 1 (Great 
freedom) to 7 (Very detailed regulations). Subsidies to aquaculture is operationalized through “To what degree do you think 
marine aquaculture should receive subsidies?”, ranging from 1 (Not subsidies at all) to 7 (A lot of subsidies). Effectiveness of 
institutions is a dichotomous variable where 1= effective institutions (treatment group A and B) and 0=ineffective (treatment 
groups C and D). Ineffectiveness of fish farmers is a dichotomous variable where 1=ineffective fish farmers (group B and D) 
and 0= effective (group A and C). Green dimension concerns placement on a green dimension in Swedish politics, originally 
ranging from 1 (Not at all green) to 7 (Very much green), but is recoded into categories 1= not green (containing original 
alternatives 1-3), 2= in the middle (original value 4) and 3 = green (original alternatives 5-6). Left-right position originally 
ranges from 0= Far to the left to 10=Far to the right with 5= neither left nor right, but is recoded 1=left, 2=centre and 3=right. 
Education ranges from 1= Basic education to 4= University education.   
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE 2016) 
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Table 5 show the models where all the control variables have been entered, which turned out 
to be the best fit in all cases, explaining the variation in the dependent to a larger degree. 
The control variables green dimension and left-right placement have a statistically 
significant effect for all the dependent variables. This implies, which is also in line with the 
theoretical assumptions, that individuals considering themselves as more green want more 
regulation of actors (.338***), more regulation of bureaucrats (.269***), more regulation 
of fish farmers (.419***), as well as more subsidies to aquaculture (.138*). This is 
interpreted as the effect of moving one scale step in green dimension yields a .338 scale step 
in the demand for regulation of actors, .269 scale step in regulation of bureaucrats, and .419 
scale step in regulation of fish farmers. Regarding subsidies to aquaculture, one scale step in 
the green dimension yields .138 scale step in subsidies to aquaculture. Left-right placement 
has a negative effect for all the dependents, implying that the more right-winged you are the 
less regulation of actors (-.255***), regulation of bureaucrats (-.158***), regulation of fish 
farmers (-.271***) you want, as well as less subsidies to aquaculture (-.180***). Education 
has a weak, but not statistically significant negative effect for regulation of actors and 
regulation of bureaucrats. For regulation of fish farmers, the effect of education is 
statistically significant (-.076**) and also for subsidies to aquaculture (-.107*).  With the 
control variables incorporated in the models, the adjusted R square significantly improves 
compared to the models without the controls (see Adjusted R2 in Table 4 for comparison), 
meaning that the models can explain the variation in the dependent variables to a larger 
degree. For regulation of actors, the model with the controls can explain 10,1 percent of the 
variation, as compared to 0 percent without the controls. For demand for regulation of 
actors, the model explains 4,9 percent, regulation of fish farmers 12,3 percent and subsidies 
to aquaculture 2,5 percent. Even if some of the control variables have a significant effect on 
the dependent variables and improves the models, the effect does not make the original 
relationships statistically significant.  
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This thesis set out to test different causal mechanisms explaining the demand for regulation 
when institutions are seen as dysfunctional. The theoretical assumption was that when 
institutions are seen as ineffective, the demand for regulation could be explained by 
willingness to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats rather than the market actors, the fish 
farmers. A post-test survey experiment was designed to study the effect of portraying actors 
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within marine aquaculture as either effective or ineffective, and see what effect this would 
have on the demand for regulation and to what degree aquaculture should receive subsidies. 
The empirical investigation of the survey experiment did not yield significant results, 
meaning that the (small) differences between the experimental groups could not be assigned 
to the different treatments in the survey experiment. Ineffective market actors do not 
increase the demand for regulation, even with ineffective or corrupt institutions (H1). 
Neither effective nor ineffective institutions have an effect on the demand of regulation or 
subsidies to aquaculture, even when fish farmers are seen as making an effort or not (H2, H3 
and H4). The final hypothesis and the main theoretical assumption of this thesis, saying that 
the effect of perceptions of ineffective or corrupt institutions can be explained by the 
demand to restrict the freedom of bureaucrats rather than fish farmers, are not supported 
either. The suggested bureaucratic capacity mechanism, proposed by Harring and 
Rönnerstrand (2016), is thus not applicable in explaining the demand for regulation in this 
particular case. The theoretical assumption from previous research, saying that ineffective 
market actors increase the demand for regulation when institutions are considered 
ineffective (for instance Aghion et al. 2010), does not hold either in this case.  
The lack of significant results and effects from the treatments on the demand for 
regulation may possibly be explained by the strength of the treatments given to the groups 
being too weak. Portraying either institutions or fish farmers as ineffective or not in one 
single sentence is perhaps not strong enough to yield significant effect. The survey text also 
proclaimed the negative effects that marine aquaculture brings with it if necessary 
precautions are not taken. The positive factors were also incorporated, but the negative 
might have overshadowed the treatments, making people find regulations necessary. 
Comparing the present study with the study of Harring and Rönnerstrand (2016), a 
contributing factor for diverging results might also be the design of the dependent variables. 
While this study has asked people to what degree they want to see more or less of regulation 
and subsidies, Harring and Rönnerstrand “force” participants to choose between three 
different policies in their study. Since individuals have to choose between policy options, 
one can question the results gained from the study. Perhaps the suggested “bureaucratic 
discretion effect” would not be present had not the participants been forced to actively 
choose between policies. And while that study finds an effect with 231 undergraduate 
students as participants, it can arguably not be generalized to the same degree as the present 
study, having 3.337 participants with a larger spread in terms of background characteristics, 
finding no effect.  
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Even if this study did not find support for the suggested causal mechanism 
explaining the demand for regulation with dysfunctional institutions, an overall interesting 
result and the contribution to the research is that the public seem to favour detailed 
regulations of marine aquaculture over great freedom. There is an overall demand for 
regulation of marine aquaculture, both of actors in general, of bureaucrats and highest for 
fish farmers. Several factors can plausibly explain this, the first being context; The survey 
experiment was conducted in Sweden, a country that can be argued to have well-functioning 
and impartial public institutions (high Quality of Government) and generally high trust 
levels. People are also accustomed to large public institutions and presumably see both 
institutions (with its bureaucrats) and regulations as well-functioning and necessary. This 
might well also be the explaining factor for the treatments in the survey experiment having 
no effect. People trust institutions and bureaucrats, and thus see regulations as necessary and 
legitimate to secure the sustainability of marine resources. Secondly, a large part of the 
participants in the survey experiment considers themselves as green on an environmental 
dimension in Swedish politics. Presumably this makes one favour more regulation of 
common resources, and see it as necessary for securing the sustainability of natural 
resources. Thirdly, the large part of the respondents in the survey experiment have higher 
education which probably makes them more aware of environmental problems in general 
and more environmentally concerned, but also makes them see the need for regulations of 
natural resources. These explanatory factors also yielded significant effects as control 
variables in the regressions in the analysis of the gathered data. A task for future research 
could be to look more into these control variables and their interaction effects.  
Future research should give this particular topic more attention. There is still no 
consensus to why there is a demand for regulation when institutions are considered 
ineffective, corrupt or incompetent. Future research could therefore delve into explaining 
what it is in political trust or distrust that makes individuals want more regulation as we still 
do not know the causal mechanism in political trust that makes individuals demand more 
regulation when institutions are seen as ineffective or corrupt. While the study by Aghion et 
al. (2010) is a large cross-country comparative study, the study by Harring and Rönnerstrand 
(2016) is smaller, and perhaps better for explaining causal mechanisms. The results from the 
present study however show that individuals seem to want regulation of marine aquaculture 
no matter how effective or ineffective institutions and resource users are portrayed, and 
explanations for this may be the high level of trust and confidence in institutions in Sweden 
doing the right thing. Regulations simply work as they should and work for the better good 
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of preserving natural resources. The participants are also highly educated and green, 
implying that they in fact know about the negative sides of aquaculture, are more concerned 
about the environment and see regulations as a necessary mean of securing the sustainability 
of the ocean and of the industry. Given these characteristics, it would therefore be 
interesting to test these theoretical assumptions in a context where institutions generally are 
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Appendix  
Survey experiment text: 
As a part of the Blue Growth Strategy, EU is financing expansion of aquaculture to species 
that are endangered because of overfishing. This is also a part of the strategy put forward by 
the Swedish government to promote sustainable aquaculture. As aquaculture is advancing in 
Sweden, experts, authorities and the industry are discussing how the industry should be 
managed. Aquaculture has a range of benefits; one being that it can effectively produce large 
quantities of healthy fish and seafood to meet increasing market demands, without 
compromising wild stocks. A problem with the industry is that environmental problems can 
occur if necessary precautions are not taken.  
Treatments: 
Scenario A: Experts consider that the authorities with responsibility for fish farming have 
been effective when it comes to securing the environment with new start-ups, and that even 
the fish farmers have made an effort to secure the environment.  
Scenario B: Experts consider that the authorities with responsibility for fish farming have 
been effective when it comes to securing the environment with new start-ups, and that the 
fish farmers have not made an effort to secure the environment. 
Scenario C: Experts consider that the authorities with responsibility for fish farming have 
been ineffective when it comes to securing the environment with new start-ups, but that the 
fish farmers have made an effort to secure the environment. 
Scenario D: Experts consider that the authorities with responsibility for fish farming have 
been ineffective when it comes to securing the environment with new start-ups, and that the 
fish farmers have not made an effort either to secure the environment. 	  
Table 1 Independent sample t-tests of differences between groups on control variables 
green dimension, left-right placement and education.  
Groups compared Green dimension Left-right placement Education 
A + B T = -.017, p = .986 T = .057, p= .954 T = -1,889, p = .059 
C + D T = 1,628, p = .104  T = -2,229, p = .026 T = 1,319, p = .187 
A + D T = 1,156, p = .248 T = -.575, p = .565 T = -806, p = .421  
B + D T = 1,181, p = .238 T = -.637, p = .524 T = 1,068, p = .286 
A + control T = .021, p = .983 T = -1,783, p = .075 T = -1,311, p = .190 
B + control T = .038, p = .970 T = -1,854, p = .064 T = .567, p = .571 
C + control T = .488, p = .626 T = -3,435, p= .001 T = .822, p = .411 
D + control T = -1,125, p = .261 T = -1,210, p = .227 T = -.499, p = .618 
Comment: T-tests between the treatment groups and control group on control variables green dimension, left-right placement 
and education.  
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE 2016) 
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Table 2  Mann-Whitney U tests of the differences between the groups on the dependent 
variables.  








A + B  U = 209261, p = 
.657 
U = 203437,5, p = 
.186 
U = 207331, p = 
.461 
U = 208194,5 p = 
.650 
C+ D U = 200099, p = 
.121 
U = 199760, p = 
.173 
U = 201739,5, p = 
.247 
U = 204619,5, p = 
.647 
A+ D U = 207684,5, p = 
.843  
U = 202077,5, p = 
.362 
U = 208259, p = 
.952 
U = 199722, p = 
.329 
B + D U = 212887, p = 
.808 
U = 210851,5, p = 
.689 
U = 208876,5, p = 
.425 
U = 208923,5, p = 
.589 
A + control U = 196994, p= 
.285 
U = 199639, p = 
.514 
U = 203295,5, p = 
.933 
U = 193004,5, p = 
.213 
B + control U = 205141,5, p = 
.532 
U = 196472,5, p =  
.051 
U = 205138,5, p = 
.532 
U = 202011,5, p = 
.424 
C+ control U = 200604,5, p = 
.485 
U = 203139, p = 
.837 
U = 196190,5, p = 
.198 
U = 200986, p = 
.848 
D + control U = 200497, p = 
.390 
U = 195139, p = 
.122 
U = 204802, p = 
.885 
U = 200690,5, p = 
.812 
Comment: Mann-Whitney U tests of differences between treatment groups and control groups in the dependent variables 
regulation of actors, regulation of authorities, regulation of fish farmers and subsidies to aquaculture.  
Source: Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE 2016) 
	  
 
Graphs Distribution of dependent variables in the different groups 
 
     Demand for regulation of actors   Demand for regulation of bureaucrats 
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Figure 1 and 2    Linearity of focal independent variables on regulation of actors 
  	  
Figure 3 and 4   Error-term well behaved: Distribution around the mean  
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